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Abstract
Homeownership rates in suburbs are much higher than in central cities. This paper shows that the system-
atic di¤erence between homeownership rates causes suburbanization. We consider an economy with several
regions: the central city, where most households rent, and the suburbs, where most own. Households mi-
grate and vote on local policies. Renters do not consider the e¤ect of policies on house prices. Therefore,
renter dominated central cities provide public goods ine¢ ciently and have high taxes and high debt. Since
house prices are lower in the central city, few houses are built and households migrate to the suburbs as
houses depreciate. The durability of houses has two e¤ects: it provides owners with incentives to vote for
e¢ cient policies and it makes ine¢ cient policies sustainable.
JEL Codes: H41, H73
Keywords: Suburbanization; Homeownership; Migration; Local Public Debt; Local Public Goods;
House Prices
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1. Introduction
Suburbanization has been the dominant feature in the development of large cities in the United States in
the last 50 years. While the population growth in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) was higher than
the U.S. average, many central cities experienced a declining population as most of the growth occurred
in the suburbs. Gyourko and Voith (1997) nd that the population of 17 of the 20 largest U.S. cities
that have had no change in land area declined between 1960-1990 and that the share of the metropolitan
population that lives in the central city declined in all 20 cities. Baum-Snow (2005) uses boundaries of
central cities in 1950 to compute constant area population gures. He shows that the aggregate population
of constant area central cities declined by 17% between 1950 and 1990. During this time, the population of
the U.S. increased by 64%. In the 1990s, suburbanization continued as suburbs grew rapidly although most
central cities experienced small populations gains. Suburbanization is even more striking if seen against the
background of population densities. The average population density of U.S. central cities with more than
250,000 inhabitants in 1990 was 5322 inhabitants per square mile.1 Compared to other western countries,
central cities in the U.S. are not densely populated so that suburbanization is not the inevitable result of
an increasing demand for larger homes.
Most attempts to explain suburbanization concentrate on attributes of central cities and suburbs (loca-
tion of jobs, access to highways, ethnic and social diversity, etc.) or on attributes of households (preferences
and income) that make some households more likely to migrate to the suburbs than others. This paper
shows that there exists another fundamental reason for suburbanization. Suburbanization and the decline
of central cities are the result of di¤erences in the local policies of central cities and suburbs. Local policies
di¤er because the percentage of homeowners is much higher in suburbs. In 2/2008, the average home-
ownership rate in central cities of MSAs was 53.4%. For suburbs, the average homeownership rate was
75.5%.2
We develop a political economy theory of suburbanization. To analyze the e¤ect of di¤erent homeown-
1Source: 1990 Census of Population and Housing. Density is computed as population divided by urbanized area.
2Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership. Both rates increased by about 5% during the last
decade, with the rate of homeownership for suburbs being close to the rate for communities outside MSAs.
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ership rates, we develop an innite horizon model of an economy that consists of several regions, where
regions correspond to local jurisdictions (i.e., cities). Ex ante, regions di¤er only with respect to their ma-
jorities. Initially, in one region (the central city) the majority of households rent while in the other regions
(the suburbs) the majority of households are homeowners.3 Households have identical preferences and can
migrate at zero cost. Households vote on the policy of the region in which they live. Policies specify taxes
and levels of public good provision. We distinguish between two classes of public goods. Durable public
goods depreciate over time whereas non-durable public goods can only be consumed in the period in which
they are provided. Regions nance public goods via taxes and debt. Contrary to renters, owners take the
e¤ect of the policy on the price of their house into consideration when they vote. Therefore, the region
with a renter majority provides an ine¢ ciently low level of the durable public good while regions with an
owner majority provide the e¢ cient level. Conditional on the level of the durable public good, taxes and
public debt are higher in the renter dominated region.
The model shows that the di¤erent objectives of renters and owners explain why the policies of renter
dominated central cities and owner dominated suburbs di¤er, specically why the quality of public services
is lower in central cities and why taxes and public debt are high compared to taxes and debt of suburbs.
The di¤erence between the policies causes migration to the suburbs. High taxes and a low level of public
goods are the reason that rents in renter dominated central cities are so low that house prices are below
construction costs. Therefore, no houses are built and as houses depreciate, households migrate to the owner
dominated suburbs. This relation between house prices, depreciation, and migration has been documented
by Glaeser and Gyourko (2005). They show that the population declines when house prices are below
construction costs. Gyourko and Saiz (2003) show that house prices - relative to construction costs - are
lower in central cities.
Similar to Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), the model highlights the importance of the durability of houses.
We show that durability has two e¤ects. Since houses are durable, homeowners have an incentive to vote
3The fact that owner occupied homes dominate in suburbs is no accident. One of the reasons are the strings that were
attached to federal subsidies which heavily favoured suburbs and new developments over inner cities, because inner cities were
perceived as declining (see Jackson (1985) for a detailed account of the history of suburbanization and the e¤ect of federal
subsidies). For the argument of this paper, the historic reasons for the distribution of renters and owners do not matter.
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for the e¢ cient policy. This contrasts sharply with the second e¤ect. We show that the durability of houses
makes ine¢ cient policies sustainable although there are no migration costs.
Associated with suburbanization is the decline of central cities. The term declineis usually used to
summarize di¤erent features, ranging from high crime, high poverty rates, and racial issues to the low
quality of public services, the critical nancial situation and the falling population of many central cities.
Mills and Lubuele (1997) review and discuss studies that analyze the economic and social issues of central
cities in the United States. Mieszkowski and Mills (1993) provide a summary of theories that have been
o¤ered to explain suburbanization. They distinguish between two classes of theories: natural evolution
theories and ight from blighttheories. Natural evolutiontheories are based on the monocentric city
model. Employment is concentrated at a central location and land rents adjust to compensate for trans-
portation costs. These theories emphasize the e¤ects of transportation costs and rising incomes. Contrary
to the predictions of monocentric models, house prices are not higher in the central city (Gyourko and Saiz,
2003, Mills and Simenauer, 1996). Additionally, in most MSAs, jobs are only slightly more concentrated
than residences (Glaeser and Kahn, 2003). Natural evolutiontheories do not consider inter-jurisdiction
migration or the role of local policies. But MSAs usually cover many local jurisdictions and households
that leave the central city frequently stay in the MSA but migrate to a suburb that is located in a di¤erent
jurisdiction. Inter-jurisdiction migration and the role of local policies are at the center of ight from blight
theories. These theories stress the scal and social problems and the low level of public services in central
cities. Depending on income and preferences, households migrate to the suburbs to avoid problems such
as crime, high taxes, and the poor quality of public schools and services. When migrating to the suburbs,
households sort themselves along the lines of income or preferences. A number of papers estimate the e¤ect
of parameters like crime and poverty rates on the migration decisions.4
Formalizations of the ight from blighthypothesis are based on Tiebout models. The relevance of
the Tiebout model for the analysis of suburbanization depends on whether Tiebout sorting is indeed the
main force that drives migration. To address this question, Rhode and Strumpf (2003) introduce migration
costs in a Tiebout model. Their model predicts that the heterogeneity across communities (in terms of
4For example, South and Crowder (1997), Cullen and Levitt (1999), Bayoh et al. (2006), Hoyt and Rosenthal (1997).
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preferences, incomes, and public good provision) increases as migration costs fall. They analyze a sample of
U.S. municipalities and counties from 1850-1990 and show that, contrary to the predictions of the Tiebout
Model, the heterogeneity decreased although migration costs fell signicantly.
Ho¤ and Sen (2005) combine the stratication idea of Tiebout models with the notion that homeowner-
ship matters. They develop a static model to show that individuals with di¤erent incomes can self-organize
into neighborhoods with di¤erent civic environments. If house prices depend on civic e¤orts, then home-
owners have a larger incentive to exert civic e¤ort. If credit markets are imperfect, homeownership is
beyond the reach of the poor. Together with the assumption that the marginal return to civic e¤ort in-
creases in the e¤ort of other households, this leads to neighborhoods that are segregated by income and
homeownership rates.
We are interested in the migration from central cities to suburbs. We do not discuss migration between
MSAs or why some MSAs grow faster than others. Since the population density in central cities is usually
higher than in suburbs, suburbanization is associated with sprawl. We do not analyze sprawl and its
potential costs and benets. Most of the costs and benets that are discussed in the literature are based
on notions of space, distance or related concepts like transportation costs, population density, etc. We
do not use any notion of geography or space. Instead, we show that there exist fundamental reasons for
suburbanization that are not related to geographical attributes of central cities and suburbs. We show in
section 5.2 that transportation and migration costs do not a¤ect the qualitative results.
We concentrate on aspects that characterize central cities and suburbs (public good provision, public
debt, taxes, population changes, house prices, and rents). Suburbanization has been accompanied by other
developments - most notably the segregation by income as central cities lost a disproportionate share of
high-income residents. We suppress di¤erent incomes in the formal model to simplify the exposition. We
show in section 5.1 that if households have di¤erent incomes, an extended model predicts that high-income
households are the rst to migrate to the suburbs and that low-income households concentrate in the
central city. The predictions with respect to household location are similar to those of ight from blight
models. However, the conclusions about the causes of suburbanization are entirely di¤erent. While ight
from blighttheories argue that di¤erent incomes and preferences cause suburbanization, this paper shows
6
that there exists a fundamental reason for suburbanization that is independent of whether households
have di¤erent incomes, preferences, etc. The paper shows that one reason for suburbanization is that
homeownership rates are much higher in suburbs, that renters and homeowners prefer di¤erent policies,
and that policies a¤ect house prices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium,
shows how voting on local policies leads to suburbanization and the decline of central cities, and discusses
the empirical evidence. Section 4 presents policy implications. Section 5 presents extensions of the model
that allow to analyze other aspects of suburbanization. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
We consider an economy that consists of three non-overlapping regions. At the beginning of the rst period,
a continuum of innitely lived households lives in every region. The mass of all households is 1.
2.1. Households
Households consume a private consumption good z, a non-durable local public good x, and durable local
public good y. The units of the private and the public goods are normalized such that the prices of all
goods are one. The public goods are rival and non-excludable. The variables x and y refer to the levels
of public good provision. The amount of the public good, which is needed to ensure a certain level of
provision, is linear in the mass of households that live in the region. Households can only consume public
goods that are provided by the region in which they live. Additionally, every household consumes one
unit of housing per period. For simplicity, we suppress the argument for housing in the utility function.
Time is discrete and households discount future utility with  < 1. Households maximize the sum of their
discounted utility,
1X
t=0
t(u(xt; yt) + zt)
where u(x; y) is the utility from a level x of the non-durable and a level y of the durable public good. We
assume that u is increasing, continuously di¤erentiable, and bounded from above with u0x(0; y) > 1 8y  0,
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u0y(x; 0) > 1 8x  0, and u00ii < 0 and u00ii < u00ij for i 6= j and i; j 2 fx; yg. The non-durable public good can
only be consumed in the period in which it is provided. The durable public good depreciates at rate 1 y,
i.e., y is the fraction that does not depreciate. In every period, households receive income W . Income
is used to pay taxes and rents and to buy houses and the private good. Between periods, households can
costlessly migrate to another region.
2.2. Housing
Households either rent or live in a house that they own. Houses that are rented out are owned by a
continuum of risk-neutral absentee landlords. Houses depreciate at rate 1   , i.e., the probability that a
house still exists in the next period is  with  > y. The construction of a house costs c and, additionally,
requires one unit of land. Land that is not used to build houses and houses that are not rented out earn
in every period a rent l. At the beginning of the rst period, there exists one region (the central city) in
which the majority of households rent while in the other regions (the suburbs) the majority of households
own a house.5 The mass of land in a region is larger than 1.
2.3. Policies
In every period, households vote on the policy of the region in which they live. Policies specify levels of
public good provision and a non-negative level of taxes  . The winning policy is implemented. Neither
households nor regions can commit to future policies. Public goods can be nanced via taxes and debt.
At the beginning of the rst period, the levels of debt and durables are equal to zero in all regions. Since
all households have the same preferences, all renters in a region prefer the same policy and, similarly, all
owners prefer the same policy.
2.4. Banks
Most local jurisdictions have substantial nancial obligations, e.g., public debt, underfunded pension plans,
expenditures that are required by law, etc. To keep the analysis tractable, we model nancial obligations as
5Section 5.1 relaxes the assumption that renters are the majority in the central city and shows that the qualitative results
do not change.
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public debt in form of bank loans. Regions and households have access to a perfectly competitive banking
sector. Banks collect savings and make loans. Let i be the risk-free interest rate with 1+ i = 1 . To simplify
the exposition, we assume that debt contracts are one-period contracts, i.e., the debt has to be repaid in the
next period (where, of course, banks and regions can sign a new debt contract). A debt contract species
an amount and an interest rate. Regions are local sovereigns. Hence debt contracts cannot be enforced
against regions and debt contracts cannot be conditioned on the implemented policy. If a region does not
meet its debt repayment obligations, banks can seize the tax receipts until the debt is repaid but banks
cannot determine the policy.6
2.5. Timing
At the beginning of a period houses are built. Households buy and sell houses and rents are paid. After
that, regions and banks sign public debt contracts and households decide how much to save and how much
to consume. After debt contracts are signed, households vote and the winning policy is implemented.7
Regions collect taxes and the transfer between regions and banks takes place. After that, regions provide
public goods. At the end of the period, houses and the durable public good depreciate. After the end of
the period and before the next period starts, households migrate.
Rents that are paid in the rst period do not a¤ect future policies, migration, etc. Therefore, we assume
that in the rst period in all regions the mass of households is equal to the mass of houses and ignore the
determination of rst-period rents.
6 In equilibrium, regions do not default. We need assumptions about default procedures to determine optimal policies (i.e.,
debt). In reality, creditors cannot seize taxes. The crucial point is not our assumption that creditors can seize taxes but that
there are some costs associated with bankruptcy. Municipal bankruptcy is much more complicated and procedures depend
on state law and on the federal bankruptcy code (Chapter 9). The purpose of Chapter 9 is to provide a nancially-distressed
municipality protection from its creditors while it develops and negotiates a plan for adjusting its debt. §943(b)(7) of the
federal bankruptcy code requires that "the plan (for adjustment of debts) is in the best interest of creditors and is feasible".
Our results for the case of a default display these features (i.e, the new debt contract is in the best interest of creditors and
is feasible).
7We assume that debt contracts are signed before households vote. Two observations motivate the timing structure: local
jurisdictions are sovereigns that can not fully commit to a policy and policies are feasible only if banks provide the necessary
funds. The assumption that debt contracts are signed before households vote is equivalent to the assumption that households
rst vote on policies and after that debt contracts are signed where banks take into account that regions can not fully commit
to implement the policy that was voted for.
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2.6. Assumptions
Dene xs, ys such that u0x(x
s; ys) = 1 and u0y(x
s; ys) = 1 and dene xe, ye such that u0x(x
e; ye) = 1 and
u0y(x
e; ye) = 1  y. Note that xs, ys and xe, ye are unique. While xs, ys maximize utility in a one shot
game, xe, ye are the e¢ cient level of public good provision.8
Assumption 1 W > xe + ye(1  y) + l + c(1  )
Assumption 1 ensures that income is large enough to nance the e¢ cient level of public goods and to
replace depreciated houses.
Assumption 2 u(xs; ys)  xs   ys > u(xe; ye)  xe   ye(1  y)  c(1  )
Assumption 2 is a technical assumption that ensures that the di¤erence between the utility from nanc-
ing the e¢ cient level of public goods and nancing the ine¢ cient one-shot level is not too large relative
to the cost of housing. If Assumption 2 is not satised, the equilibrium does not change except that the
population of the region with the renter majority decreases even faster.
Assumption 3 If all households in a region are indi¤erent between renting and buying a house, then
the ratio of renters to owners is the same as in the period before.
In equilibrium, households are indi¤erent between renting and owning. Hence, a tie-breaking rule is
necessary to determine the ratio of renters to owners. Assumption 3 reects the fact that di¤erences in the
proportion of renters and owners between suburbs and central cities have been stable over time and that
the past homeownership rate of a city is a very good predictor for future homeownership rates. The reason
is that homeownership rates are to a large extent determined by the physical structure of the housing
stock. Certain types of housing that are overrepresented in suburbs (e.g., single family homes) are much
more prone to be owner occupied than others (e.g., large apartment complexes) that are more common in
central cities. While 88% of households that live in single family detached units are owners, only 58.7% of
households in attached single family units are owners and only 13.6% of households in multi-family units
8The levels xe and ye are e¢ cient if the population of the region does not decline too fast, i.e., if the population does not
decline faster that the durable public good depreciates. This is true in equilibrium for all regions and periods.
10
are owners9 . Since houses are durable, the physical structure of the housing stock changes only slowly and,
therefore, homeownership rates are fairly constant. We discuss in section 3.4 the incentives for households
to inuence homeownership rates and in section 4 the rationale for why a welfare maximizing policy maker
wants to inuence homeownership rates.
2.7. The Housing Market
Households consume one unit of housing per period. Hence, in every period and every region, the mass of
houses is larger than or equal to the mass of households. Land that is not used to build houses and houses
that are not rented out earn in every period a rent l. Since in every region the mass of land is larger than
1, land prices are the same in all regions and constant over time. Let P be the price of a unit of land with
P = l1  . If houses are built, the price of a house in that region has to be equal to the total construction
costs c+P . Hence equilibrium house prices cannot be lower than P and cannot be higher than c+P . Since
rented houses are owned by a continuum of absentee landlords, the market for rented houses is perfectly
competitive and absentee landlords earn zero prots. In equilibrium, the price of a house is equal to the
discounted sum of expected rents plus the discounted price of land if the house depreciates. Let pjt and
rjt be the house price and the rent in region j and period t. In equilibrium, pjt can be written as
pjt = rjt + (1  )P +
X1
s=1
()s [E[rjt+s] + (1  )P ]
where expectations are taken at the beginning of period t when houses are sold and rent contracts are
signed. Rearranging gives
rjt = pjt   E[pjt+1]  (1  )P . (1)
Hence, households are indi¤erent between renting or owning a house. Assumption 3 implies that majorities
do not change. Four conditions hold at the equilibrium of the housing market: the mass of households in
a region is smaller or equal to the mass of houses, rents are determined by eqn.(1), p 2 [P; c+ P ] with
p = c + P if houses are built in that region, and rents are equal to l if the mass of households is smaller
9Source: American Housing Survey 2003
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than the mass of houses.
2.8. Migration
Households migrate to maximize their expected utility. Since migration a¤ects house prices, house prices
and, therefore, rents depend on expected policies and expected migration. There are no stochastic elements
in the model, so that there is no uncertainty about equilibrium policies and migration. Therefore, we
suppress the expectation operator.
The discounted future utility is a function of future policies and of the wealth of a household. Since
utility is quasilinear and since (1 + i) = 1, households are indi¤erent between saving and consuming
the private good. Wealth itself a¤ects neither migration nor the preferred policy. But of course, when
households migrate or vote, they take into account how this a¤ects their wealth. Quasilinearity of the
utility function allows to add the change in wealth due to rents and taxes and the utility from public
goods to derive a measure of how living in a region a¤ects the expected discounted utility. Consider the
migration decision at the end of period t   1. When households decide whether or not to migrate, they
anticipate that, given the outcome of the migration process, regions implement the equilibrium policies.
Equilibrium policies and rents depend on the population allocation, the majorities, and the stock of debt
and durables. Let n denote a generic population allocation. The superscript  indicates equilibrium values.
Let rjt(n); xjt(n); y

jt(n), and 

jt(n) be the rents and the equilibrium policies in region j in period t given
some population allocation n, the majorities in all regions, and the stock of debt and durables which are
determined in t 1. As shown above, in equilibrium, households are indi¤erent between renting and owning
so suppose that the household rents in the next period. The indirect per-period utility vjt is the sum of
the change in wealth that results from living in region j in period t (i.e., from rents and taxes) and the
utility that is derived from public goods:
vjt(n) = u(x

jt(n); y

jt(n))  rjt(n)  jt(n).
Since the indirect per-period utility vjt is used to analyze migration, vjt is dened for all possible population
12
allocations. Note that vjt(n) is evaluated at the equilibrium policies given n. While equilibrium policies
are equal to the Condorcet winner and are dened for all n, equilibrium rents are not necessarily dened
for all n 6= nt . Let njt and hjt be the mass of households and the mass of houses in period t in region j.
Since houses that are not rented out earn a rent l, we have rjt = l if njt < hjt 1. If njt > hjt 1, houses
are built and pjt = c + P and rjt is determined by eqn.(1). If njt = hjt 1, the equilibrium conditions
for the housing market only require that pjt 2 [P; c+ P ]. Therefore eqn.(1) does not determine rjt exactly
but denes an interval Ijt of possible rents. In equilibrium, households are indi¤erent towards migration.
This condition determines a unique rjt if n

jt = hjt 1. Since this is an equilibrium argument, it does
not apply if nt 6= nt . Let k denote a region where nkt > hkt 1 and, therefore, rkt is dened by eqn.(1).
If njt = hjt 1 and nt 6= nt , rjt(nt) is dened as rjt(nt) = argmin jvjt(nt) max fvkt(nt)gj subject to
rjt 2 Ijt. Intuitively, this denition of rjt reects that di¤erences in indirect per-period utilities cause
migration and, thereby, put pressure on rents to adjust.10
Recall that migration is costless. Hence at the equilibrium population allocation, the indirect per-period
utilities vjt+1(nt+1) are equal across regions. Dene V

t+1 as the sum of discounted indirect equilibrium
utilities, i.e., V t+1 =
X1
s=1
s 1vjt+s(nt+s). Consider the migration decision at the end of period t   1.
Let Vjt be the sum of discounted indirect perperiod utilities of a household that lives in period t in region
j as a function of the population allocation:
Vjt(n) = vjt(n) + V

t+1.
Note that Vjt is not a standard value function since households cannot choose n to maximize V . Instead,
households compare V across regions and migrate to maximize their utility.
To formalize migration, we divide the time between periods into Z intervals. In each interval, a region
is randomly selected. If region j is selected, a fraction 3Z of the population of region j migrates according
to the migration rule. We consider the limit as Z ! 1. Let j, k, m denote the regions. Let n be the
10The denition of rjt if njt = hjt 1 and nt 6= nt is a purely technical assumption to ensure that rents are well-dened
everywhere. The assumption does not a¤ect the results.
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population allocation at some point during the migration process. Consider the migration between period
t  1 and t.
Migration Rule: Households migrate from region j to region k if Vjt(n) < Vkt(n) and Vmt(n) < Vkt(n).
If Vjt(n) < Vkt(n) = Vmt(n) households leave region j and split equally among k and m. Otherwise
households stay in j.
According to the migration rule, households migrate myopically in the sense that they evaluate future
utilities at the equilibrium strategies but do not anticipate that additional households migrate. In equilib-
rium, indirect utilities have to be equal across regions. Therefore, the migration rule is equivalent to the
assumption that rational households with perfect foresight migrate to maximize their utility.
2.9. Public Debt and Endogenous Debt Limits
There exist various kinds of restrictions on the debt of local jurisdictions. The model suppresses exogenous
debt limits to highlight that regions face endogenous debt constraints since banks have to accept debt
contracts. We discuss exogenous debt limits in section 3.3. Since banks are perfectly competitive, they
accept all debt contracts that yield non-negative prots. Let Djt 1 be the per-capita debt of region j at
the end of period t  1. In period t region j has to repay the last period debt plus interest and takes out
new per-capita debt Djt. Public debt is the liability of a region and is not enforceable against households.
Households can migrate to avoid the high taxes that are necessary to serve a high debt. Hence, when banks
decide which debt contracts they accept, they consider how public debt a¤ects equilibrium policies and
migration. Specically, banks take into account that the burden of interest and principal does not become
so high that all households prefer to migrate to other regions. Whether region j indeed fullls its debt
repayment obligations in period t depends on two factors:
- the winning policy in t
- the new debt contract Djt
The rst point reects the fact that regions are local sovereigns and, therefore, households are free to vote
for a policy such that the region does not meet its debt repayment obligations. With respect to the second
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point, recall that banks accept all debt contracts on which they make non-negative prots. To take both
points into account, we use the following denition of default:
Denition 1 (Default) Region j is in default if there exists no policies that are consistent with
utility maximizing households that migrate according to the migration rule such that region j meets its
debt repayment obligations, banks make non-negative prots on new debt contracts, and Djt <18t.
Proposition 1 below shows that the equilibrium strategy of banks can be described by a debt limit
Dmaxjt > 0 such that banks accept in period t all debt contracts of region j with Djt  Dmaxjt . To simplify
notation, we denote the debt limit by Dmaxjt , although, in general, the debt limit depends on the population
allocation. In equilibrium, regions do not default. However, default procedures are important because they
determine Dmaxjt . We discuss the e¤ect of default procedures in section 3.3. Proposition 1 below shows
that if a region defaults, then banks reduce the debt such that the region is no longer in default. Hence no
region is in default when households vote.
3. Suburbanization
Since no region is in default when households vote, it follows from Denition 1 that households vote for
policies such that regions meet their debt repayment obligations. When banks decide, which debt contracts
they accept, they anticipate future policies and migration. Since there are no stochastic elements in the
model, there is no uncertainty about equilibrium policies and migration and, in equilibrium, regions do not
default. Hence banks charge the risk-free interest rate i, and the net per-capita transfer in period t from
region j to banks is (1 + i)Djt 1
njt 1
njt
  Djt. Then, in equilibrium, the budget constraint
xjt + yjt   yyjt 1
njt 1
njt
  jt   (1 + i)Djt 1njt 1
njt
+Djt (2)
is satised for all j and t. In period t, renters in region j vote for the policy that maximizes
u(xjt; yjt)   jt + V t+1
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subject to eqn.(2), to yjt  yyjt 1 njt 1njt , and to the constraint that banks accept the debt contract Djt.
Owners take the e¤ect of the policy on the price of their house into account. Owners vote for the policy
that maximizes
u(xjt; yjt)   jt + V t+1 + pjt+1
subject to the same constraints as above.
Ex ante, regions di¤er only in their majorities. Assumption 3 implies that majorities do not change in
equilibrium. Since policies are determined by the majority, we refer to the region with a renter (owner)
majority as renter (owner) region. Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium of the dynamic game. We state
equilibrium strategies in the form of policies that are implemented in equilibrium. Equilibrium policies
and outcomes are indicated by superscript . The subscripts o and r indicate owner and renter regions,
the subscript t indicates the time period.
Proposition 1. (i) In equilibrium, the population of the owner regions increases. Owner regions provide
in all periods the e¢ cient level of public goods, xot = x
e and yot = y
e 8t. Taxes, public debt, house
prices and rents are constant over time, with ot = x
e + (1   y)ye, Dot = yye, pot = c + l1  , and
rot = (1  )c+ l 8t.
(ii) The population of the renter region decreases, nrt = 
t 1nr1. For all t > 1, prt =
l
1  , r

rt = l,
and Drt = D
max
rt . In the rst period, u
0
x(x

r1; y

r1) = u
0
y(x

r1; y

r1) and x

r1 + y

r1 = max fDmaxr1 ; xs + ysg
and r1 = max f0; xs + ys  Dmaxr1 g. For t > 1, u0x(xrt; yrt) = 1, yrt = max
n
ys; nrt 1nrt yyrt 1
o
, and
rt = x

rt +max
n
0; ys   nrt 1nrt yyrt 1
o
+ (1+i)Drt 1nrt 1nrt  Dmaxrt . There exists T <1 such that yrt = ys,
xrt = x
s, rt = 

rT , and D

rt = D
max
rT for all t  T .
(iii) For every region j and period t, there exists a maximum per-capita debt Dmaxjt > 0 such that banks
accept debt contracts if and only if Djt  Dmaxjt . For owner regions, Dot < Dmaxot 8t. For the renter region,
Drt = D
max
rt 8t. Banks charge the risk-free interest rate. In equilibrium, regions do not default. If a region
is in default, banks cancel the minimum amount of debt such that the region is not in default anymore.
The proof is relegated to the appendix.
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In the remainder of the section, we discuss the results of the model and relate them to the empirical
observations. Since the percentage of renters in central cities is much higher than in suburbs, we refer to
regions with renter (owner) majority as central city (suburb) when we discuss the empirical evidence and
when we derive policy implications.
3.1. Homeownership Rates and Expenditures on Public Goods
Proposition 1 shows that suburbanization and the decline of central cities can occur even when all house-
holds have the same preferences, the same income, and when the spatial distribution of jobs and residences
does not matter. One reason for suburbanization and the decline of central cities are di¤erences in the
local policies. Local policies di¤er because the percentage of renters is much higher in central cities than in
suburbs. The di¤erent percentages of renters in central cities and suburbs do not only explain migration
but also why central cities provide public goods ine¢ ciently and why debt and taxes are high relative to
the utility from public goods.
When owners vote, they take the e¤ects of debt and durable public goods on house prices into account.
Proposition 1 shows that owner regions provide the e¢ cient level of public goods. Contrary to owners,
renters are neither a¤ected by the negative e¤ect of debt on house prices nor can they capture the positive
e¤ect of durable public goods. This is the reason why the renter region (except for possibly the rst periods)
underprovides the durable public good and takes out the maximum debt that banks approve. Non-durable
public goods do not a¤ect future house prices. Therefore, the renter region provides the e¢ cient level
(except for possibly the rst period). Note that the results about public good provision in the renter region
in the rst periods are driven by the assumption that regions have zero debt and no durable public goods
at the beginning of the rst period.
Although the percentage of renters and owners di¤ers drastically and systematically between central
cities and suburbs, renters are only in a few central cities the majority. To simplify the exposition, we
assume that all households have the same quasilinear preferences and that regions have di¤erent majorities.
If preferences are not quasilinear and households di¤er along several dimensions (i.e., homeownership,
preferences, income), one would expect that an increase of the homeownership rate causes a gradual change
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of policies. The empirical analysis of the e¤ect of homeownership rates on local policies is complicated
by the fact that high expenditures on public goods can be the result of high costs or of an ine¢ cient
provision instead of a high level of public goods.11 Additionally, certain public services are in some areas
provided by cities and in others by special districts where special district boundaries in many cases do not
coincide with city boundaries. There are few studies which estimate the e¤ect of homeownership rates on
local expenditures for durable and non-durable public goods. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998) and Monroe
(2002) use data from the Census and the Census of Governments. DiPasquale and Glaeser nd that - both
on city and county level - homeownership reduces total expenditures, increases the share of expenditures for
highways, and reduces the share of expenditures for welfare. On the city level, homeownership has a very
small negative e¤ect on the share of expenditures for education while this e¤ect is much stronger and positive
on the county level. Similar, Monroe nds that homeownership increases the share of expenditures on
durable public goods (sewers, roads, and parks) and reduces welfare spending.12 Glaeser and Shapiro (2002)
use local public nance variables from the City and County Data Book. They nd that homeownership
reduces per capita expenditures and reduces the share of spending on welfare. They also report that
homeownership reduces spending on health and hospitals and increases spending on highways. While we
assume that taxes have to be non-negative, welfare spending (i.e., negative taxes) is of course an example
for a non-durable public good because it benets some of the current residents but does not a¤ect future
house prices. Haughwout (1993) emphasizes the di¤erent attitudes of renters and owners towards public
investment in infrastructure (i.e., durable public goods). He uses two variables to measure the e¤ect of
homeownership rates on the percentage of spending that is allocated to investment. He nds a strong
positive and highly signicant e¤ect if the median voter is a homeowner and a positive but insignicant
e¤ect for the percentage of homeowners. If the dummy variable for the median voter is excluded, the
percentage of homeowners has a positive and highly signicant e¤ect on the share of spending that is
11Many types of public capital (e.g., roads, bridges, buildings) have well-dened best practice maintenance paths. Owners
prefer a best practice maintenance policy. Renters prefer that maintenance is deferred although this leads to exceedingly high
repair or replacement costs at a later date.
12Monroe reports somewhat di¤erent results when FHA loan conditions are used as instruments for homeownership. With
instrumental variables, homeownership reduces spending on roads, sewers, and parks and in one of the IV specications,
homeownership increases spending on welfare. The problem with this approach is that the instruments su¤er from endogene-
ity. Specically, if local policies (i.e., spending on durable public goods) are (partly) capitalized in house prices, then the
instruments (e.g., percentage of houses which are a¤ordable under FHA criteria) are functions of the dependent variable.
18
allocated to investment.
These studies analyze the e¤ect of homeownership rates but do not distinguish between central cities
and suburbs. Similarly, in our model, regions are initially identical except for majorities. In reality, a
large share of the public capital is concentrated in central cities. For example, the per-capita capital stock
related to mass transportation is much higher in central cities, roads in central cities are more heavily used
by suburban residents than vice versa, etc. Since we suppress these issues in the model, the results of the
model are not predictions about the absolute capital stock or the absolute expenditures on infrastructure
but on capital stock and expenditures relative to the e¢ cient level.
3.2. House Prices, Migration, and the Durability of Houses
Besides policies, regions also di¤er in terms of rents, house prices, and population growth. House prices are
lower in the renter region because renters do not take the e¤ect of public goods and debt on house prices
into account. Households anticipate that renter regions provide public goods ine¢ ciently and that taxes
in the renter region are high to serve the debt. Since migration is costless, the equilibrium indirect utilities
from living in a region have to be equal. Therefore, rents in the renter region have to be lower. Rents are
bounded from below by l because houses are used for other purposes (e.g., o¢ ces) if rents are even lower.
The lower bound on rents together with the equilibrium public good provision and the condition that
equilibrium indirect utilities are equal determine the maximal tax that a region can levy and, therefore,
determine the maximal debt Dmaxrt that the region can repay. Since D

rt = D
max
rt , house prices in the renter
region are equal to l1  with
l
1  = P . Since house prices are below the total construction costs c + P ,
no new houses are built in the renter region. While house prices in the renter region are determined by
the opportunity cost of houses and land, house prices in the owner regions are equal to total construction
costs. The analysis of the housing market shows that the reason for suburbanization is independent of
whether households have di¤erent incomes, preferences, etc. Rents in the central city are so low (relative
to construction costs and the price of land) that it is not protable to construct residential housing. Over
time, households migrate to the suburbs because houses depreciate and no new houses are built in the
central city. We show in section 5.1 that di¤erent incomes do not cause migration but only determine
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which households migrate to the suburbs.
In reality, houses are built in central cities albeit in much smaller numbers than in the suburbs. The
result that no houses are built is due to the assumption that the housing supply is perfectly elastic. We
show in section 5.4 that the central city population can stagnate or even increase (but at a lower rate than
the population of the suburbs) if the housing supply is an increasing function of the house price.
This relation between house prices, depreciation, and migration has been documented by Glaeser and
Gyourko (2005). Glaeser and Gyourko analyze how the durability of houses inuences the e¤ects of exoge-
nous shocks on urban growth and decline. Using data from 321 cities, they estimate the relation between
population growth and the percentage of housing that is priced below construction costs. They nd that
for every 10% more of the housing stock that is valued below construction costs, the population growth
rate decreased by 2.7%. The most extreme case in 1990 was Detroit where 96.3% of single family houses
were valued below construction costs (excluding the cost of land) and 88.5% were valued at least 20%
below construction costs. In our model, equilibrium house prices in owner regions are constant and equal
to c+ P independently of how many households migrate to the owner regions. House prices in the renter
region are lower and equal to P although in every period, the population declines only by a fraction 1  .
Glaeser and Gyourko nd exactly this asymmetric relation between house prices and population changes.
They document that even a rapid increase of the population has little e¤ect on house prices but that house
prices can fall steeply although the decline in population is small.
The model highlights the importance of the durability of houses for local policies. Since houses are
durable, the downward adjustment rate of the housing stock equals the depreciation rate of houses except
if house prices are so low that it is protable to use residential houses for other purposes. If house prices are
below total construction costs, no new houses are built and the population is determined by the depreciation
of the housing stock. Only if house prices are equal or above total construction costs, houses are built, and
the population growth determines how fast the housing stock grows. The durability of houses is the reason
why the direction of causality between population change and evolution of the housing stock switches and
why the housing supply is inelastic if house prices are below total construction costs. The durability of
houses has two e¤ects on local policies:
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1) since houses are durable and immobile, homeowners vote for the e¢ cient policy
2) the durability of houses makes ine¢ cient policies and a high per-capita debt sustainable.
To see the second e¤ect, note that only because houses are durable, house prices can drop below total
construction costs. If the policy of a region is ine¢ cient or if its debt is high, the utility from living in
this region (i.e., from public goods and taxes) is low relative to the utility from living in other regions.
Unless rents and house prices are lower, all households migrate to some other region. Since houses are
durable, house prices can drop below total construction costs, i.e., below house prices in other regions where
the population grows. If policies are ine¢ cient, house prices and rents drop while the population adjusts
over time as houses depreciate. Hence, the durability of houses makes ine¢ cient policies and high debt
sustainable because it ensures that the population of a region does not drop to zero although migration
costs are zero. To formalize the argument, suppose that houses in the renter region are not durable but
depreciate after one period. Let the adjusted construction costs in the renter region be equal to (1  )c.
Recall that by assumption, households cannot choose where to live in the rst period. Then in equilibrium,
xr1 = x
s, yr1 = ys, Dmaxr1 = 0, and nrt = 0 for all t > 1. Hence the population drops to zero after the rst
period and the ine¢ cient policy is not sustainable.
Our model predicts that rents and house prices are lower in central cities (i.e., in renter regions) than
in suburbs (i.e., owner regions). Obviously, the price of land in central cities is not necessarily the same as
in suburbs. Our results concerning rents and house prices should be interpreted as rents and house prices
in central cities being lower relative to construction costs plus price of land. Gyourko and Saiz (2003) nd
that in most MSAs the percentage of houses that are priced below 90% of the construction costs is much
larger in central cities than in suburbs. All MSAs where the percentages were approximately equal had
a very small percentage of houses priced below the 90% limit. Their measure of construction costs does
not include the price of land. Since land is usually cheaper in suburbs, the di¤erence in the percentage of
houses that are priced below construction cost plus price of land is probably even larger. Similarly, Mills
and Simenauer (1996) do not include land prices. They nd that constant quality house prices are 11.5%
higher in suburbs.
Equilibrium policies of owner regions are independent of the mass of households that immigrate. Hence,
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the equilibrium does not change if the migration rule species that households migrate to a particular region
if they are indi¤erent. The relevant prediction of our model with respect to the population of owner regions
is that for all owner regions njt  njt 1 and that the total mass of households that live in owner regions
increases. Therefore, our results are in line with the ndings of Lucy and Phillips (2003) who report that in
the 1990s the population was stagnant or decreasing in 13 of the suburbs of the most populous metropolitan
areas. To simplify the exposition, we consider the simplest model with three regions. Many MSAs have
several central cities and more than two suburbs. Equilibrium policies, debts, rents, house prices, and
migration do not change if there exists more than one renter region or more than two owner regions.
3.3. The E¤ect of Public Debt
The model highlights the importance of debt for the e¢ cient provision of public goods. In our model, debt
includes all nancial obligations of a region, e.g., public debt, underfunded pension plans, expenditures
that are required by law, etc. Regions have two kinds of assets: durable public goods and nancial assets
(i.e., debt). In equilibrium, yy

ot Dot(1+i) = 0 8t, i.e., at the beginning of a period, the value of the net-
assetsof an owner region is zero. This implies that the utility from living in an owner region is not a¤ected
by immigration. If the population of a region grows independently of current policies, lowering the current
tax by  increases the per-capita debt at the beginning of the next period by less than (1 + i). In this
case, all households prefer to lower the current tax and increase the debt. However, if yy  D(1 + i) < 0,
owner regions compete for immigrants, since the positive e¤ect of sharing the debt with more households
outweighs the negative e¤ect of the crowding of the durable public good. This competition is the reason
that, in equilibrium, yy

ot Dot(1+ i) = 0 8t. The result that net-assets of owner regions are exactly zero
is driven by the assumption that the cost of public goods is linear in the mass of households. The bottom
line of the result is that owners vote for policies such that the marginal e¤ect of immigration on the utility
of owners is zero.
Relative to the level of the durable public good, renter regions have higher debt than owner regions,
i.e., yy

rt  Drt(1 + i) < 0 for all t. In the renter region, the positive e¤ect of immigration via a decrease
of the per-capita debt outweighs the negative e¤ect of the additional crowding of the durable public good.
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Although the renter region would benet from immigration, its population decreases because prt < c+ P
and, therefore, no houses are built.
There exist various kinds of restrictions on the debt of local jurisdictions in the U.S. The model sup-
presses exogenous debt limits to highlight that regions face endogenous debt constraints since banks have
to accept debt contracts. The endogenous debt constraints are determined by the equilibrium policies, the
evolution of the population allocation, and the prot maximization of perfectly competitive banks. While
debt limits reduce the probability of scal stress, they do not change the reasons for the ine¢ cient public
good provision in renter regions. Consider debt limits that impose some upper bound on the per-capita
debt. If owner regions face a binding debt limit, they provide in every period an ine¢ ciently low level of
durable public goods. A debt limit that binds for the renter region a¤ects at most the public good provision
in the rst periods but it does not mitigate the ine¢ cient provision in the long-run. And while such a debt
limit leads to higher rents and house prices in the renter region, it a¤ects neither policies or house prices
in owner regions nor the migration from the renter to the owner regions. While simple restrictions on the
per-capita debt are ine¤ective, we propose in section 4 a rule that relates changes of the per-capita debt
to changes in the provision of public goods. Under this rule, all regions provide public goods e¢ ciently. If
there are no debt limits, the renter region takes out the maximal debt Dmax and sets taxes to maximize
the tax revenue. If a binding debt limit exists, taxes are below the revenue maximizing level. Although
various kinds of debt limits exist, there is evidence for some central cities that taxes are close to the revenue
maximizing level (Inman, 1992, Haughwout et al., 2004).
In our model, regions do not default in equilibrium since there are no stochastic shocks. In reality,
defaults of municipalities occur but are rare. Litvack and McDermott (2003) report cumulative default
rates for tax backed general purpose bonds of around 0.4% and cumulative default rates for traditional
revenue backed bonds (transportation and utilities) of around 0.05%.13 Given the small number of defaults,
it seems to be a reasonable simplication to assume that there are no stochastic shocks and, therefore, no
defaults in equilibrium. But since the maximal debt is determined by the payo¤s that are realized if a
13Default rates are higher for municipal bonds issued on behalf of corporations or by municipal entities that are vulnerable
to corporate risks.
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region defaults, it is necessary to analyze default procedures.
To model default costs, we assume that banks have the right to seize the tax revenue if a region defaults.
Proposition 1 shows that if a region defaults, then banks reduce the debt by the minimal amount such that
the region is no longer in default. To see the intuition, consider the end of period t  1 before households
migrate. Suppose that region j is in default. Households and banks anticipate that the region will fail to
meet its debt repayment obligation unless the debt is reduced. If region j indeed fails to meet its debt
repayment obligation in t, then banks can seize the tax revenue. From Denition 1 follows that it cannot be
optimal for households to vote for taxes that are higher than the outstanding debt. Hence banks seize the
complete tax revenue. Households anticipate this and will either all migrate to a di¤erent region or vote for
 jt = 0. In the latter case, the cost of a default for households is the disruption of the provision of public
goods. The only way how banks can ensure that at least part of the debt is repaid is via a commitment
not to seize the complete tax revenue. Banks reduce the debt by the minimal amount that ensures that
the region is not in default anymore. The strategic reduction of the debt serves as commitment of banks
not to seize the tax revenue. Once the region is not in default anymore, households vote for positive taxes
and the reduced debt can be served. Hence if a region defaults, banks recover only part of their debt.14
3.4. Zoning
Most of the literature on zoning focuses either on the use of zoning regulations as a way to attract households
with a high tax-to-service ratio via imposing a minimum housing consumption or on zoning regulations as
a way to restrict the supply of new houses and thereby to increases house prices. Our model shows that
there exists an additional reason for zoning regulations. Certain types of housing are mostly inhabited by
renters, others are mostly owner occupied. While 88% of households that live in single family detached
units are owners, only 58.7% of households in attached single family units are owners and only 13.6%
of households in multi-family units are owners15 . Renters prefer a di¤erent policy than owners and as a
result, house prices are lower in renter regions. Therefore, owners do not want the majority to change from
14Litvack and McDermott (2003) report an average recovery rate for municipal bonds of 67% which is much higher than
the average recovery rate of around 40% for corporate bonds.
15Source: American Housing Survey 2003
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owners to renters. Zoning regulations (e.g., minimum lot sizes or restrictions on the level of residential
development density) are an e¤ective instrument to control which types of housing are built and, therefore,
can be used to ensure that renters do not become the majority.
4. Policy Implications
Our model shows that one reason for suburbanization is that central cities provide public goods ine¢ ciently
because they have a large percentage of renters and renters prefer an ine¢ cient allocation of public goods.
We do not attempt analyze the cost and benets of sprawl or to determine the optimal population allocation.
Therefore, policy implications refer to the mitigation of ine¢ cient policies and not to the stop or reversal
of suburbanization. We have shown in section 3.3 that debt limits are ine¤ective because renters prefer
an ine¢ cient allocation of public goods. Two policy instruments that are used to inuence local policies
are standards for the provision of public goods and grants which lower the cost of public goods for local
governments. Under very strong assumptions, grants and standards can eliminate the ine¢ cient provision
of public goods. Most authors are sceptical whether these assumptions are realistic and there exists a large
literature that discusses problems of grants and standards (e.g., lobbying, asymmetric information about
preferences, free-riding, y-paper e¤ect, etc.).
There are two ways to solve the problem of ine¢ cient public good provision. The rst is to increase
homeownership rates, the second is a simple accounting rule that ties changes of the per-capita debt to
changes in the provision of public goods.
Encouraging homeownership has long been a policy objective in the United States16 and huge amounts
have been spent to encourage homeownership. In 2005, tax expenditures for the deductibility of mortgage
interest and property taxes on owner occupied homes amount to more than $85 billion. Tax expenditures
for the exclusion of capital gains taxes on home sales amount to more than $36 billion17 . Sinai and Gyourko
16See, for example, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeownership/> and: U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban
Development: The national homeownership strategy: partners in the American dream, 1995, Washington, D.C.
17There are also provisions in the tax code that favor rental housing (e.g., exception of passive loss rules for rental losses,
credit for low-income housing, and accelerated depreciation of rental housing). The tax expenditures for these measures
amount only to $8.9 billion.
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States 2006, Table 469
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(2004) estimate that the real cost of tax subsidies for homeownership was $420 billion in 1999. Our model
shows that these enormous e¤orts to increase homeownership should be concentrated at inner cities, or
more general, on jurisdictions with a large fraction of renters.
The main political motivation for encouraging homeownership and the main topics of scholarly interest
are private benets of homeownership (e.g. educational outcomes of children, life satisfaction, nancial
stability) and social benets (e.g. neighborhood stability, community involvement, likelihood to maintain
the property)18 . This paper shows that there exist additional benets from increasing homeownership.
If increasing homeownership leads to a change of the majority, then it leads to a change of local policies
and to a Pareto-improvement. Owner regions provide public goods e¢ ciently regardless of past policies.
Hence, if the majority changes from renters to owners, then the region starts to provide the e¢ cient level
of public goods. House prices, policies, rents and, therefore, the indirect per-period utility in the other
owner regions do not change. Therefore, e¤orts to increase homeownership should be concentrated on
the renter dominated central cities instead of mainly subsidizing homebuyers in owner dominated suburbs
as is current practice. The result that policies change if and only if the majority changes is due to the
assumption that all households have the same preferences. We show in section 5.1 that an increase of the
homeownership rate causes a gradual shift towards a more e¢ cient provision of public goods if households
di¤er along several dimensions (e.g., homeownership, preferences, income).
Increasing homeownership rates changes the composition of the electorate but does not restrict the set
of feasible policies. A di¤erent way to achieve e¢ cient public good provision is via a rule that ties changes
of the per-capita debt to changes in the provision of public goods. Let Aj = yyjt 1  Djt 1(1 + i), i.e.,
Aj is the value of the net-assetsof region j at the beginning of period t. Consider a rule that species
that yyjs  Djs(1 + i)  Aj for all s  t. It is straightforward to show that under this rule, all regions
provide the e¢ cient level of public goods regardless of their respective majorities.19 This rule combines
two aspects. The rst is the standard concept that current residents pay only for what they consume.
18See, for example, DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998), Rohe et al. (2001), Rossi and Weber (1996), Green and White (1997)
19Under this rule, for an extra dollar spent on y, regions need to nance only 1  y via taxes. It follows immediately that
the renter region provides x and y such that u0x = 1 and u0y = 1   y. Banks will accept the higher per-capita debt of the
renter region. The policy of the owner regions does not change.
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The second is the commitment aspect. The rule commits regions to use additional debt only to nance
the provision of the durable public good.20 Only because of this commitment are banks willing to provide
additional credit to the renter region. The advantage of this rule is that the current nancial situation is
taken as starting point. Hence no transfers are necessary to implement this rule.
5. Extensions
We have shown above that the systematic di¤erence between the homeownership rates of central cities and
suburbs and the fact that renters and owners prefer di¤erent policies cause suburbanization. The analysis
concentrates on aspects that characterize central cities and suburbs rather than their residents: population
growth, the e¢ cient/ine¢ cient provision of public goods, public debt, taxes, and house prices. Obviously,
suburbanization includes other important aspects which are suppressed in the model above. One advantage
of the model is that it generates explicit solutions which makes it straightforward to extend the model to
analyze other aspects of suburbanization. In this section, we discuss several extensions and their results.
5.1. Income Heterogeneity and Di¤erent Percentages of Renters instead of Di¤erent Majori-
ties
The assumption that households have homogenous quasilinear preferences and that renters are the majority
in central cities is an idealization that allows to determine policies via the Condorcet winner. Although
the di¤erence between the ratio of renters to owners in central cities and suburbs is huge and constant over
time, renters are the majority only in some central cities. And of course, preferences are not homogenous
and incomes matter because preferences are not quasilinear. Hence there exist many groups that di¤er by
income, preferences, and by whether they rent or own. Suppose that the implemented policy is a weighted
average of the policy that each group prefers where weights are determined by the relative mass of each
group. To relate implemented policies to the optimal levels of public goods, dene the e¢ cient level of
public goods as the weighted average of the e¢ cient levels across groups.
20Debt restrictions and debt policies vary widely across cities. Miranda et al. (1997) report that many cities have policies
that state that debt should not be used to nance current expenditures but only for infrastructure investments.
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Our model shows that suburbanization occurs even if incomes are the same. In reality incomes di¤er
and one of the most prominent aspects of suburbanization is that central cities have systematically lost
high-income residents. Accordingly, most of the literature on suburbanization analyzes some kind of sorting
along income. Consider a situation where at the beginning of the rst period the distribution of preferences
and incomes is the same for all regions and where the percentage of renters is higher in the central city.
Suppose that the marginal utility of the durable public good increases in the consumption of the private
good. Renters prefer a higher level of public debt and a lower level of the durable public good than owners
who have the same income and the same preferences. If the implemented policy is a weighted average of
the policy that each group prefers, then all regions provide an ine¢ cient level of the durable public good
but the underprovision is more severe in the central city and the public debt is higher. Hence rents are
lower in the central city and, therefore, no houses are built and the population decreases.21 In equilibrium,
V rt = V

ot holds for the marginal household. After the rst period, households migrate in both directions.
Low-income households migrate from the suburbs to the central city while high-income households migrate
from the central city to the suburbs. In later periods, the households with the highest income leave the
central city as houses depreciate and migrate to the suburbs. Households in the central city prefer a low
level of durable public goods (due to the sorting of households) and, additionally, the underprovision of the
durable public good is more severe in the central city. Note that policies are not constant over time since
migration a¤ects the income distribution and, therefore, the implemented policies. The argument with
respect to migration and sorting is similar for heterogeneous preferences or if taxes depend on income.
If households are credit-constrained such that homeownership is beyond the reach of the poor or if
high-income households benet more from tax subsidies for homeownership, then the sorting along income
reinforces the renter dominance in the central city and the owner dominance in the suburbs. Note that
households migrate because house prices in the renter dominated central cities are so low that no or only
few houses are built. Whether incomes di¤er has no e¤ect on the net-migration from central cities to
suburbs but determines only which households migrate. This shows that suburbanization is driven by the
21The result that no houses are built is driven by the assumption that the housing supply is perfectly elastic at p + c.
Section 5.4 discusses the case when the housing supply is an increasing function of the price.
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fact that the percentage of renters is much higher in central cities and that it is not crucial whether renters
are indeed the majority in the central city or that all households have the same income and homogeneous
preferences.
5.2. Transportation and Migration Costs
Suburbanization is associated with sprawl since central cities usually have a higher population density.
The costs of sprawl are primarily determined by transportation costs. Depending on where jobs are
located, ine¢ ciencies arise from a suboptimal allocation of households across regions. Under the standard
assumption, jobs are located in the central city. Let cT > 0 be the per-period transportation costs from the
suburbs to the central city. In equilibrium, the indirect per-period utilities vjt di¤er by cT . If households
face additionally migration costs cM , then equilibrium indirect per-period utilities di¤er by cT +(1  )cM .
If cT and cM are not too high, equilibrium policies do not change. Note that Dmaxrt increases in cT and cM .
Since the qualitative results of our model do not depend on cT and cM , it is straightforward to include
transportation and migration costs to model the spatial dimension of an MSA and to analyze potential
welfare gains or losses due to the migration to the suburbs.
5.3. Property Taxes
In 2002, property taxes accounted for 24.9% of the total revenue of local governments and for 72.9% of the
total revenue from taxes.22 The qualitative results of our model do not change when regions levy property
taxes. Expectations about future local policies a¤ect house prices and, therefore, a¤ect the house values
that are determined by tax assessors. Note that if a region implements a di¤erent policy than what was
expected, then house prices adjust but house values (i.e., the tax base) do not change before the next
reassessment. Hence when households vote on taxes and public goods, house values are already realized.
For simplicity, assume that house values are equal to the house prices at the beginning of the period.
Suppose that regions nance public goods via debt and property taxes. Let  be the tax rate that is
levied on houses. The situation is essentially the same as under a lump-sum tax. Owners take the e¤ect of
22Source: 2002 Census of Governments
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debt and durable public goods on future house prices into account when they vote. Hence owner regions
provide public goods e¢ ciently. As in the original model, the value of net-assets Dot(1 + i)  yyot is zero
since owner regions compete for immigration. In equilibrium, house prices, taxes, rents, and public debt
in owner regions are constant over time with pot = c+
l
1  , 

ot =
xot+(1 y)yot
pot
, rot = c(1  ) + otpot,
and Dot = yy

ot.
Contrary to owners, renters do not take the e¤ect of policies on future house prices into account. Since
house values (i.e., the current tax base) are determined before households vote, renters vote to maximize
tax revenues in order to maximize the utility from public goods. In reality, there are both explicit limits on
property taxes (e.g., Proposition 13 in California) and implicit limits (taxes cannot be so high that owners
and landlords prefer to tear down their houses to avoid taxes). Regardless of what limits taxes, renters
prefer the same ine¢ cient allocation of public goods as in the original model (i.e., such that marginal
utilities are equal subject to yrt  yyrt 1 nrt 1nrt ). Hence the renter region underprovides the durable public
good and Drt = D
max
rt . House prices are below construction costs plus price of land but can be larger than
l
1  . Hence, no new houses are built in the renter region and n

rt = nrt 1 because households migrate to
the owner regions as houses depreciate.
The tax base (i.e., the assessed house value) is a function of the house price which depends on the
expected policies. Two aspects of the political system are important for the results. The rst is that once
taxes are collected, the assessed house values are not corrected if the region implements a di¤erent policy
than what was expected. The second aspect is that regions cannot commit to implement certain policies.
In reality, partial commitment is possible in some cases (long-term projects). A continuum of equilibria
exists if the renter region can perfectly commit to implement some policy in the next period.23
5.4. Stagnating or Increasing Central City Population and Elastic Housing Supply
While the population of most central cities declined between 1950 and 1990, most central cities experienced
small population gains in the 1990s while suburbs experienced much larger population gains. The crucial
23Note that the case of perfect commitment is equivalent to the assumption that in every period house prices (and, therefore,
rents), taxes, and public good provision are determined simultaneously.
30
observation with respect to the development of the population allocation is that house prices (relative to
construction costs and the price of land) are higher in the owner dominated suburbs because owners take
the e¤ect of policies on house prices into account. The result in Proposition 1 that no houses are built in
the central city is driven by the simplifying assumption that the supply of housing is perfectly elastic. In
reality, houses are built in central cities albeit in much smaller numbers than in the suburbs. Suppose that
in every region, the supply of new houses is an increasing function of the price. As shown above, house
prices (relative to the price of land) are higher in the owner dominated suburbs. If the housing supply
function is the same in all regions, then less houses are built in the central city than in the suburbs. In
most central cities, land is more scarce than in the suburbs which means that even less houses are built
compared to the situation where the housing supply is the same in all regions. The results about the
e¢ cient provision of public goods in the owner regions and the ine¢ cient provision in the renter regions do
not change. If the total population increases, it is possible that the population in the central city increases
but at a lower rate than in suburbs.
5.5. Absentee Landlords
The assumption that rented houses are owned by absentee landlords is common but unsatisfactory since
part of the payo¤s are attributed to agents outside the model. Consider the model above except that rented
houses are owned by competitive investment funds and each household owns the same portfolio of shares
of funds. The qualitative results are similar. The equilibrium policy of owner regions and the equilibrium
strategies of banks are the same as in Proposition 1. Renters take the positive e¤ect of the durable public
good and the negative e¤ect of debt on the price of funds into account. The level of the durable public
good in the renter region is strictly decreasing because the population of the renter region decreases and,
therefore, the weight of houses in the renter region on the price of funds decreases. Banks anticipate that
renters take the e¤ect of the policy on the price of funds into account. Hence Dmaxrt is higher compared to
the situation where rented houses are owned by absentee landlords. Depending on the initial assumptions,
it is possible that Drt < D
max
rt and r

rt > l in the rst periods but there always exists T < 1 such that
Drt = D
max
rt and r

rt = l for all t  T . House prices in the renter region are so low that no new houses are
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built. Therefore, households migrate to the owner regions as houses depreciate.
6. Conclusion
Suburbanization has been the dominant feature in the development of large cities in the United States.
Most attempts to explain suburbanization concentrate on attributes of central cities and suburbs (location
of jobs, access to highways, ethnic and social diversity, etc.) or on attributes of households (preferences
and income) that make some households more likely to migrate to the suburbs than others. This paper
shows that there exists another fundamental reason for suburbanization. Di¤erences in the local policies of
central cities and suburbs can cause suburbanization and the decline of central cities. Local policies di¤er
because majorities di¤er, specically, because the percentage of renters is much higher in central cities than
in suburbs.
To analyze the e¤ect of di¤erent homeownership rates, we develop a dynamic political economy model
where the central city corresponds to a region with a renter majority and suburbs correspond to regions
with an owner majority. Local policies in the central city and the suburbs di¤er because renters do not take
the e¤ect of local policies on house prices into account. Hence renter dominated central cities have higher
debt, higher taxes, and a lower quality of public services than owner dominated suburbs. The combination
of high taxes and ine¢ cient public good provision makes living in central cities unattractive compared to
living in the suburbs. Therefore, rents and house prices in central cities are low relative to construction
costs and the price of land (see Gyourko and Saiz 2003). Hence, few houses are built in the central city
while large numbers are built in the suburbs. As houses depreciate, households migrate to the suburbs.
These results suggest a new interpretation of suburbanization. Migration to the suburbs is not a ightbut
the consequence of the depreciation of houses and of house prices that are a¤ected by local policies. While
ight from blighttheories argue that di¤erent incomes and preferences cause suburbanization, the paper
shows that the underlying reason for suburbanization is independent of whether households have di¤erent
incomes, preferences, etc. We show in an extension of the model that di¤erent incomes, preferences, etc.
do not cause suburbanization but determine only which households migrate to the suburbs.
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The model highlights the importance of the durability of houses for local policies. Since houses are
durable, the downward adjustment rate of the housing stock is essentially limited by the depreciation rate
of houses. If house prices are below construction costs, no new houses are built and the population is
determined by the depreciation of the housing stock. Only if house prices are equal or above construction
costs, houses are built, and the population growth determines how fast the housing stock grows. The
durability of houses is the reason why the direction of causality switches and why the housing supply is
inelastic if house prices are below construction costs. These consequences of the durability of houses are
important for the local policies. If the policy of a region is ine¢ cient or if its debt is high, the utility from
living in this region is low relative to the utility from living in other regions. Unless rents and house prices
are lower, all households migrate to a region with a more e¢ cient policy. Since houses are durable, house
prices can drop below construction costs, i.e., below house prices in other regions where the population
grows. Hence, if policies are ine¢ cient, house prices and rents adjust while the population adjusts only
over time as houses depreciate. The paper shows that the durability of houses has two e¤ects:
1) it provides incentives for owners to vote for the e¢ cient policy
2) it makes ine¢ cient policies and a high per-capita debt sustainable.
The model generates clear policy implications. There are two ways to avoid the ine¢ cient provision
of public goods. The rst is to increase homeownership rates and thereby to change the composition of
the electorate. In contrast to renters, owners vote for the e¢ cient provision of public goods. Therefore,
programs to increase homeownership rates should not be concentrated on suburbs where the overwhelming
majority owns a house but instead on renter dominated central cities and, more general, on jurisdictions
with a large proportion of renters. The second is a rule that ties changes in per-capita debt to changes
in public good provision. Since the paper does not attempt to analyze the benets and costs of sprawl,
policy implications refer to the ine¢ cient provision of public goods but not to the stop or reversal of
suburbanization itself.
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7.1. Appendix
Let j, k denote owner regions and let r denote the renter region. A generic owner region is denoted by o. Let
vo be the equilibrium indirect per-period utility from living in an owner region, i.e., v

o = u(x

o; y

o) o ro .
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Note that in equilibrium, owner regions implement the same policies and, therefore, Vjt+1(nt) =
Vkt+1(nt) = Vot+1(nt) 8t. Recall that renters do not take house prices into account and that house prices
are bounded above by c + P . For the proof of part (i), we only assume that Vrt+1(nt)  Vot+1(nt) which
is equivalent to the assumption that equilibrium house prices in the renter region are not higher than in
the owner regions. We show in part (ii) that, in equilibrium, Vrt+1(nt) < Vot+1(nt) 8t.
Households vote on the policy x; y;  . Using the budget constraint eqn.(2) we can write the policy
decision as choosing x; y;D. Since x does not a¤ect future utilities and migration, we concentrate on
deviations from the equilibrium strategies that a¤ect D and y and show later that xo is optimal.
1) Consider deviations of owner region j in period t such that Vjt+1(nt) = Vkt+1(nt) still holds. Suppose
region j provides yo +dy in t where dy is such that y(y

o +dy)  yo and adjusts  jt such that Vjt+1(nt) =
Vkt+1(nt) still holds. Since Vjt+1(nt) = Vkt+1(nt) implies that Djt(1 + i)   yyjt = 0 still holds, we have
d =
 
1  y

dy and dD = ydy. Since Djt(1 + i)  yyjt = 0 still holds and since yyjt  yo , optimal
policies in t + 1 and migration between t and t + 1 are not a¤ected by the deviation and V t+1 does not
change. Since Vrt+1(nt)  Vot+1(nt) we have njt+1  njt and, therefore, pjt+1 = c + P = po, i.e., pjt+1
is not a¤ected by the deviation. Since u0y(x

o; y

o) = 1   y and u00yy < 0, the utility gain from additional
public goods is smaller than the loss from higher taxes (for dy < 0, the utility loss from less public goods
is larger than the gain from lower taxes). Hence the deviation reduces u(xjt; yjt)   jt + pjt+1 + V t+1,
i.e., reduces the payo¤ of owners in region j. If dy is so large that yyjt > y

o , then Vjt+1(nt) = Vkt+1(nt)
implies that there exists 4 > 0 such that Djt(1 + i)  yyjt =  4. Hence d = (1  y)dy + 4. From
u0y(x

o; y

o) = 1  y, u00yy < 0, and dy > 0 follows that u(xjt; yjt)   jt decreases by more that 4. Since
households migrate to j, we have pjt+1 = c + P = po. Then V

t+1 increases by at most
4njt
njt+1
. Since
njt+1 > njt, the deviation reduces the payo¤ of owners in j.
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2) Consider deviations of owner region j in period t such that Vjt+1(nt) > Vkt+1(nt). Note that
Vjt+1(nt) > Vkt+1(nt) implies that Djt(1 + i)  yyjt < 0 and that njt+1 > njt. Hence houses are build in
t+1 and pjt+1 = c+P = po. A deviation from the equilibrium policy via an increase of  by d reduces Djt
by d . Hence V t+1 increases by (1 + i)d
njt
njt+1
. Since (1 + i) = 1 and since Vjt+1(nt) > Vkt+1(nt) implies
that njt+1 > njt, region j does not want to deviate and reduce the debt such that Vjt+1(nt) > Vkt+1(nt).
The same argument shows that region j does not want to deviate and increase both  jt and yjt such that
Vjt+1(nt) > Vkt+1(nt). From this argument follows immediately that it cannot be part of an equilibrium
that Vjt+1(nt) = Vkt+1(nt) and Dot(1+ i)  yyot < 0 since both owner regions would have an incentive to
decrease taxes in t and increase the debt in t.
3) Above, we considered unilateral deviations of region j in period t such that Vjt+1(nt)  Vkt+1(nt).
For such deviations of j, neither the other owner region nor the renter region have an incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium policies. Now consider deviations of j such that Vjt+1(nt) < Vkt+1(nt). (Similar to
the argument above, it is straightforward to show that j cannot gain if it provides an ine¢ cient level of y.
Hence we consider only deviations with  jt < o.) We show rst that owners in j are indi¤erent towards
a unilateral deviation with  jt < o. Then we show that for  jt < 

o, owners in k prefer to vote for some
kt with  jt < kt < o. Finally, a Bertrand-style argument establishes that Vjt+1(nt) < Vkt+1(nt) cannot
be part of an equilibrium.
Consider a unilateral deviation with  jt = o   d with d > 0 and, therefore Djt(1 + i)   yyjt > 0
and Vjt+1(nt) < Vkt+1(nt). Then njt+1 < njt. Since it cannot be part of an equilibrium that the debt
increases indenitely, either in some period taxes are raised above o or less public goods are provided.
Hence, in that period rents are below ro . Since house prices are equal to the discounted sum of rents
plus the discounted price of land, house prices in t + 1 have to be smaller than c + P . Hence no new
houses are build in region j in t + 1 and njt+1 = njt. Suppose region j repays the additional debt in
t + 1. Then  jt+1 has to increase by (1 + i)d
njt
njt+1
. Note that V t+1 (and similar V

t+2 and so on) is not
a¤ected by a unilateral deviation with  jt < o. Consider an owner household in j. With probability
1  his house depreciates and the household receives V t+1. If the house does not depreciate, assume wlog.
that the household stays in j (the assumption is wlog. because, in equilibrium, households are indi¤erent
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towards the region they live in). The discounted utility of an owner in region j in t can be written as
u(xjt; yjt)   jt+(1  )V t+1+ (u(xjt+1; yjt+1)   jt+1+V t+2). Since  jt+1 increases by (1+ i)d njtnjt+1
with njt+1 = njt owners are indi¤erent towards a unilateral deviation with  jt < o. Of course, the same
argument implies that owners are indi¤erent towards deviating and repaying the additional debt in t+ 2,
and so on.
Now we show that for  jt < o, owners in k prefer to vote for some kt with  jt < kt < 

o. Consider
 jt = 

o   4 with 4 > 0. For any 4 > 0 exists  with 4 >  > 0 such that region k can implement
kt = 

o    and Vjt+1(nt) < Vkt+1(nt) and Vrt+1(nt) < Vkt+1(nt) still hold. Then households migrate
from region j to region k and njt+1 = njt and nkt+1 > nkt and, therefore, pkt+1 = po since houses are
build in k. Suppose that the additional debt is paid back in t + 1. Then kt+1 = o +
(1+i)nkt
nkt+1
. From
nkt+1 > nkt follows that     (1+i)nktnkt+1 > 0 and, therefore, it is indeed optimal for k to reduce kt. Since
    (1+i)nktnkt+1 is increasing in , the best response to  jt < o is not well-dened because of an open set
problem.
We have shown above that owners in j are indi¤erent towards a unilateral deviation with  jt < o
since V t+1 does not change. However, if region k reduces kt with  jt < kt < 

o, then V

t+1 decreases by
(1+i)nkt
nkt+1
. Applying the same argument as above, owners in j would have been better o¤ if they implemented
some tax e jt with kt < e jt < o.
From this argument follows immediately that it cannot be part of an equilibrium that Vjt+1(nt) =
Vkt+1(nt) and Dot(1+ i)  yyot > 0 since both owner regions would have an incentive to increase taxes in
t and to decrease the debt in t.
Hence in equilibrium Vjt+1(nt) = Vkt+1(nt) and Do(1 + i)   yyo = 0. Since Do(1 + i)   yyo = 0,
migration reduces the per-capita debt and the level of durables in an owner region by the same amount
and, therefore, V t+1 = Vot+1(nt) 8t. Hence V t+1 and equilibrium policies of owner regions depend neither
on the mass of households that migrate to the owner regions nor on the relative mass of households in
the owner regions. Note that Do(1 + i)   yyo = 0 implies that o > 0. Hence u0x(xo; yo) = 1. In part 1
we have shown that, in equilibrium, owner regions provide y such that u0y = 1   y. Hence yo = ye and
xo = x
e. Then Do and 

o follow immediately. In equilibrium, owner regions implement the same policy
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and house prices and rents across owner regions are the same and constant over time. Hence po = c+
l
1 
and ro = (1  )c+ l.
We show in the proof of (ii) that the population of the renter region decreases. Since owner regions
implement the same policy, it follows immediately from the migration rule that the population in the owner
regions increases.
(ii) We show rst that it cannot be part of an equilibrium that Vrt+1(nt)  Vot+1(nt). Recall that renters
vote for the policy that maximizes u(xjt; yjt)    jt + V t+1 while owners vote to maximize u(xjt; yjt)  
 jt+ V

t+1+pjt+1. Hence it cannot be part of the equilibrium that house prices are higher in the renter
region. Suppose that there exists some t such that Vrt+1(nt) > Vot+1(nt). Since equilibrium house prices
cannot be higher in the renter region and since some houses have to be built, we have pot+1 = c+P . Hence
not+1  not. Since y < , the condition that yot  yyot 1 not 1not does not bind. Hence in equilibrium,
the policies in owner regions are indeed independent from the policy of the renter region (as assumed in
the proof of part (i)). Therefore, Vot+1(nt+1) = Vot+1(nt) = V t+1. As shown in the proof of part (i),
in equilibrium, V t+1 does not change if more households migrate to the owner region. Renters vote to
maximize u(xrt; yrt)   rt + V t+1. Hence it cannot be part of an equilibrium that Vrt+1(nt) > Vot+1(nt)
because renters in the renter region prefer to decrease  rt and increase Drt because this does not a¤ect
V t+1.
Hence, in equilibrium, Vrt+1(nt) < Vot+1(nt) and V t+1 is independent of the mass of households that
migrate to the owner regions. Hence, in equilibrium, the policy in the renter region maximizes u(xrt; yrt) 
 rt, subject to  rt  0, yrt  yyrt 1 nrt 1nrt , subject to eqn.(2) and subject to the constraint that banks
approve the debt contract. Hence Drt = D
max
rt 8t. Then xr1; yr1, and r1 follow immediately.
Next, we show that prt < c+P . Suppose that prt = c+P8t > 1. Then
P
()srrt+s =
P
()sro8t > 1.
Since migration is costless, in equilibrium, indirect per period utilities are equal across regions. HenceP
()srrt+s =
P
()sro8t > 1 implies that
P
()s[u(xrt+s; yrt+s)  rt+s] =
P
()s[u(xe; ye) o]8t > 1
and, therefore, that
u(xrt; yrt)   rt = u(xe; ye)  o8t > 1 (A1)
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Recall that  rt = xrt + yrt +
nrt 1
nrt
(Drt 1(1 + i)   yyrt 1)   Drt. Since u(x; y)   x   (1   y)y 
u(xe; ye)  xe   (1  y)ye8x; y and o = xe + (1  y)ye eqn.(A1) implies that  nrt 1nrt (Drt 1(1 + i) 
yyrt 1) +Drt  yyrt. Since Vrt+1(nt) < Vot+1(nt), in equilibrium, nrtnrt+1 > 1. From induction follows
that eqn.(A1) implies that
Drt(1 + i)  yyrt  (1 + i)t 1(Dr1(1 + i)  yyr1) (A2)
Hence if Dmaxr1 (1+ i) yyr1 > 0, then prt = c+P8t > 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium because eqn.(A2)
would imply that lim
t!1Drt =1. In t = 1, renters vote for the policy that maximizes u(xr1; yr1)  r1 subject
to  r1  0, to eqn.(2), and to Dr1  Dmaxr1 . Hence if yr1 > ys it has to be true that Dmaxr1 (1+ i) yyr1 > 0
and we are done. Note that yr1 < y
s cannot be part of the equilibrium. Hence consider yr1 = y
s. Note that
prt = c + P8t > 1 would imply that nrt  nrt 18t > 1. Since Drt = Dmaxrt , it is su¢ cient to show that
there exists  > 0 such that banks make non-negative prots if Dr1 = yy
s + . Consider Dmaxrt = yy
s
8t. Then yrt = ys and xrt = xs for all t. Recall that ro = l + c(1   ). From Assumption 2 follows
that there exists rrt > l such that for nrt 2 [nrt 1; nrt 1] the indirect per-period utilities are equal across
regions. Hence there exists  > 0 such that Dmaxrt  yys +  for all t. Hence prt = c+P8t > 1 cannot be
part of the equilibrium.
It remains to show that it cannot be part of the equilibrium that there exists bt > 0 such that prbt = c+P .
Suppose the contrary, i.e., suppose that in equilibrium, there exist bt > 1 and  > 0 such that prbt = c+ P
and prbt+1 = c+P  4 . Then u(xrbt; yrbt)  rbt = u(xe; ye) o+4 andP1s=1()s[u(xrbt+s; yrbt+s)  rbt+s] =P
()s[u(xe; ye)   o]   4 . Note that prbt = c + P implies that nrbt = hrbt and, therefore, prbt+1 < c + P
implies that nrbt+1  nrbt. Consider a rearrangement of taxes and rents in the renter region such that
indirect per-period utilities do not change, the population does not change, and the debt in the last period
under consideration does not increase. Specically, consider an increase of  rbt by 4 and a reduction of
rrbt by 4 and a reduction of  rbt+1 by 4 and an increase of rrbt+1 by 4 . Then prbt = prbt+1 = c + P and
Drbt+1 does not increase compared to the situation before taxes and rents were changed. In the same way,
one can change taxes and rents such that prt = c+ P8bt  t  et such that Dret does not increase compared
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to the situation before taxes and rents were changed. Consider the limit as et goes to innity. Recall that
we showed above that prt = c + P8t  bt would imply that lim
t!1Drt = 1 and that Dret is not higher after
the rearrangement. Hence prbt = c + P for some bt > 1 implies that limt!1Drt = 1 which cannot be part
of an equilibrium. Hence prt < c + P8t. Hence no houses are built in the renter region and, therefore,
nrt  hrt 18t > 1. Hence nrt  t 1nr18t > 1.
We show next that Drt = Dmaxrt and nrt+1  nrt imply that rrt+1 = l. In equilibrium, the dis-
counted protfrom owning a house has to be bigger or equal than the sum of discounted land rents, i.e.,P1
s=0()
srrt+s +
P1
s=0 (1  )()s l1   l1  8t > 1. Rewrite this as
P1
s=0()
srrt+s  l1  . Suppose
that there exists t such that
P1
s=0()
srrt+s >
l
1  . Then there exists bt and 4 > 0 such that rrbt = l+4.
Suppose that banks agree to increase Drbt 1 by 4nrbt(1+i)nrbt 1 . For simplicity, assume that yrbt 1 is not a¤ected
by the increase of Drbt 1 (which is true in equilibrium for  su¢ ciently small). Except for  rbt, the policy
in bt does not change. Hence Dmax
rbt does not change and  rbt has to increase by 4. Of course, households
anticipate the increase of  rbt and, therefore, rrbt decreases by 4 and indirect per-period utilities in bt and,
therefore, the population allocation in bt are not a¤ected. HenceP1s=0()srrt+s > l1  implies that banks
can increase the debt and still make non-negative prots. (The argument is similar if yrbt 1 changes). Since
Drt = D
max
rt 8t, in equilibrium,
P1
s=0()
srrt+s =
l
1  for all t > 1. Hence, r

rt = l and p

rt =
l
1  8t > 1.
Since migration is costless, at the equilibrium population allocation, indirect per-period utilities are
equal across regions. Since rrt = l 8t > 1 and rot = l+(1  )c 8t > 1, it follows from Assumption 2 that
 rt > 08t > 1. As shown above, renters vote to maximize u(xrt; yrt)    rt subject to  rt  0, to eqn.(2),
to Drt  Dmaxrt and to yrt  yyrt 1 nrt 1nrt . Then xrt; yrt, and rt follow immediately.
Let nrt = min[nrt 1; hrt 1]. Recall that migration between t   1 and t starts at nrt 1. Then for all
nrt  nrt 1 in equilibrium vrt(nrt)  vo because otherwise Drt 1 < Dmaxrt 1. Hence the migration rule
implies that nrt  nrt 1. Since rrt = l it follows that nrt  nrt. To show that nrt = t 1nr1 we show rst
that vrt is increasing in nrt for nrt  nrt.
Case I: ys < nrt 1nrt yyrt 1.
Since rt > 0 we have yrt =
nrt 1
nrt
yyrt 1. Hence, the total amount of the durable public good in the
renter region is independent of nrt. Since vrt+1 depends on the total amount of debt and durables in t,
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Dmaxrt depends on nrt. Since D

rt = D
max
rt we can write the total equilibrium debt in t as nrtD
max
rt (nrt).
In equilibrium, nrtDmaxrt (nrt) is non-decreasing in nrt for nrt  nrt. To see why, suppose the opposite.
Then there exists enrt < bnrt such that enrtDmaxrt (enrt) > bnrtDmaxrt (bnrt). Let evrt+1 and bvrt+1 be the indirect
per-period utilities if the population in t is enrt and bnrt. Then bvrt+1 > evrt+1 for all nrt+1  hrt. This
cannot be part of an equilibrium because either Drt(bnrt) < Dmaxrt (bnrt) or the renter region defaults in t+1
if nrt = enrt. Hence nrtDmaxrt (nrt) is non-decreasing in nrt.
Let Brt be the total transfer from the renter region to banks in t. Since by assumption ys <
nrt 1
nrt
yyrt 1
we have yrt =
nrt 1
nrt
yyrt 1 and, therefore, Brt = nrt( rt   xrt). Note that Brt,  rt, and xrt are functions
of nrt. Since the total debt is non-decreasing in nrt, we know that Brt is non-increasing in nrt. Suppose
that Brt is constant. Recall that rrt = l and that u
0
x = 1 at x

rt. Then
@vrt
@nrt
=  u0yyyrt 1 nrt 1nrt 2 + Brtnrt 2
for nrt  hrt 1. Since rrt = l and vrt(nrt)  vo for all nrt  nrt 1 it follows from Assumption 2 that
u(xrt; yrt)   rt < u(xs; ys)  xs   ys. Hence  rt   xrt > u0yyrt. Hence if Brt is constant, vrt is increasing
in nrt for all nrt  hrt 1. Obviously, vrt is also increasing in nrt if Brt is decreasing in nrt.
Case II: ys  nrt 1nrt yyrt 1.
Hence yrt = ys and the total amount of the durable public good is increasing in nrt. Let Q(nrt) =
nrtD
max
rt (nrt). The same argument as in Case I shows that Q(nrt) has to be non-decreasing in nrt. Then
@Dmaxrt
@nrt
  Q(nrt)(nrt)2 . Since vrt(nrt) = u(xs; ys)  xs   ys  
nrt 1
nrt

Dmaxrt 1  (1 + i)  yyrt 1

+Dmaxrt (nrt)  l
we have @vrt@nrt 
nrt 1
(nrt)
2

Dmaxrt 1  (1 + i)  yyrt 1
  Q(nrt)(nrt)2 . From vrt(nrt)  vo for all nrt  nrt 1 it follows
that Assumption 2 implies that for all nrt  nrt we have nrt 1

Dmaxrt 1  (1 + i)  yyrt 1

> Q(nrt). Hence
@vrt
@nrt
> 0 for all nrt  nrt.
We have shown that vrt is increasing in nrt for all nrt  nrt. Recall that nr1 = hr1. Since vrt is
increasing and since banks accept all debt contracts on which they make non-negative prots and the
renter region takes out the maximal debt, nrt = hrt 1 for all t > 1 and, therefore, n

rt = 
t 1nr1.
Recall that y < . From n

rt = hrt 1 and 

rt > 0 for all t > 1 it follows immediately that there exists
T <1 such that yrt = ys and xrt = xs for all t  T . Since the public good provision is constant for t  T
and since rrt = l for t > 1, debt, and therefore, taxes are constant for t  T .
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(iii) Banks are perfectly competitive. Standard Bertrand-style arguments establish that banks accept
all debt contracts which yield non-negative prots. Banks decide whether to accept debt contracts before
policies are realized. Since yjt andDjt a¤ect Vjt+1(nt), they a¤ect migration and policies in t+1. Therefore,
Dmax is a function of the expected policies and banks compute Dmax under the assumption that regions
implement the equilibrium policies. Since there are no stochastic elements, there is no uncertainty about
equilibrium policies and migration. Hence, in equilibrium, regions do not default and banks charge the
risk-free interest rate i.
As shown in the proof of part (i), owner regions take out debt Do although they could repay a larger
debt. Hence Do < D
max
ot 8t and the constraint that banks have to accept debt contracts does not bind for
owner regions. It remains to show that there exists a unique Dmaxrt such that banks accept debt contracts
of the renter region if and only if Drt  Dmaxrt .
In the rst period, the renter region chooses xr1; yr1;  r1 to maximize u(xr1; yr1)   r1 s.t. Dr1  Dmaxr1
and eqn.(2). Hence Dmaxr1 determines a unique y

r1. As shown above, 

rt > 08t > 1 and nrt = t 1nr1.
Hence yrt = max

ys;

y

t 1
yr1

. Therefore, Dmaxr1 determines a unique x

rt and y

rt 8t. Given Dmaxr1 ,
let T be the rst period in which yrt = y
s, i.e., T is the unique integer for which

y

T 2
yr1 > y
s 
y

T 1
yr1. For all t  T , yrt = ys and xrt = xs. As shown above, rrt = l. Let vo denote the per-period
utility from living in an owner region. Since in equilibrium indirect per-period utilities are equal across
regions, we have u(xs; ys)   rt   l = vo for all t  T . Since Drt = Dmaxrt , yrt = ys, and xrt = xs for
t  T we have rt = xs + ys

1  y

+Dmaxrt 1(1 + i)
1
  Dmaxrt for t  T . Since it cannot be part of the
equilibrium that the debt explodes, Dmaxrt is constant for all t  T . Dene the long-run per-capita debt
Dmaxr1 as the unique solution to
u(xs; ys)  xs   (1 + i  )

Dmaxr1  

1  y


ys   l = vo
Then Dmaxrt = D
max
r1 for all t  T . If xs + ys  Dmaxr1 , we have T = 1 and obviously Dmaxrt exists and
Dmaxrt = D
max
r1 8t.
Now consider the case where xs+ys < Dmaxr1 . In this case, T > 1. Given yrt 1 and Drt 1, dene Drt as
44
the minimal debt in t such that the renter region does not default in t if regions implement the equilibrium
policies. Hence for t > 1, Drt is dened by
u(xrt; y

rt)  xrt  
Drt 1(1 + i)

+Drt   yrt +
y

yrt 1   l = vo 8t > 1 (A3)
where yrt = max

ys;

y

t 1
yr1

and xrt is dened by u
0
x = 1. Applying eqn.(A3) recursively where
Drt 1 is set equal to Drt 1 when computing Drt generates for every Dr1 a sequence
 
Drt
1
t=2
.
Banks accept all credit contracts with non-negative prots and the renter region takes out as much debt
as possible. Hence Dmaxr1 is the highest Dr1 such that there exists T with DrT = D
max
r1 . From
@2u
@2x <
@2u
@x@y
follows that yr1 is increasing in Dr1 and, therefore, T is weakly increasing in Dr1. Hence there exists a
sequence of intervals (as; bs] with s 2 N, a1 = 0, and bs = as+1, such that Dr1 2 (as; bs] implies that T = s.
Since yrt is continuous in Dr1, x

rt is also continuous in Dr1. Hence, the term u(x

rt; y

rt)  xrt   yrt in
eqn.(A3) is continuous in Dr1. Therefore, Drt is continuous in Dr1.
Write Drt as function of Dr1. Assumption 2 implies that Drt(0) < 0 for all t > 1. Since u is bounded
from above, lim
Dr1!1
Drt(Dr1) = 1 for all t. Hence, 0 < Dmaxr1 < 1 and, therefore, T < 1. For an
arbitrary s, if Drs(as) < Dmaxr1 and Drs(bs)  Dmaxr1 , then by continuity of Drt there exists Dr1 2 (as; bs]
such that Drs(Dr1) = Dmaxr1 . Recall that Dr1 2 (as; bs] implies that T = s. If Drs(bs) < Dmaxr1 , then
from bs = as+1 and from eqn.(A3) follows that Drs+1(as+1) < Dmaxr1 . Hence, Drt(0) < 0, continuity of
Drt, and the fact that lim
Dr1!1
Drt =1 imply that there exists at least one s with Dr1 2 (as; bs] such that
T = s and Drs(Dr1) = Dmaxr1 . Additionally, continuity of Drt guarantees that there exists a largest Dr1
s.t. there exists s with Dr1 2 (as; bs], T = s, and Drs(Dr1) = Dmaxr1 . Hence Dmaxr1 and, therefore, Dmaxrt
are well-dened.
In equilibrium, regions do not default. To see why banks cancel part of the debt if a region is in default,
suppose that region j is in default at the end of period t   1. If region j is still in default in t, then it
will fail to meet its debt repayment obligation in t. If households vote for  jt > 0, banks optimally seize
tax receipts until the debt is repaid. From Denition 1 follows that it cannot be optimal to vote for taxes
that are higher than the outstanding debt. Hence banks seize the complete tax revenue. Hence households
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vote for  jt = 0 and, therefore, xjt = 0 and yjt = y
njt 1
njt
yjt 1. Consider migration between t   1 and t.
Households either migrate to another region or stay in region j and vote for  jt = 0. Regardless of njt,
banks receive zero. Of course, the same logic applies if region j is still in default in t + 1. The only way
to ensure that at least part of the debt is repaid is to reduce the debt such that region j is not in default
anymore. Once region j is not in default anymore, Denition 1 implies that households vote for policies
such that the (reduced) debt is repaid. From Assumption 2 follows that regions can sustain a positive
per-capita debt. Hence banks reduce the debt by the minimal amount such that region j is not in default
anymore.
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